University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2016

The Shoe Doesn't Fit: General Jurisdiction Should
Follow Corporate Structure
Seungwon Chung

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Chung, Seungwon, "The Shoe Doesn't Fit: General Jurisdiction Should Follow Corporate Structure" (2016). Minnesota Law Review.
209.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/209

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
The Shoe Doesn’t Fit: General Jurisdiction
Should Follow Corporate Structure
Seungwon Chung*
Imagine a mining corporation—its corporate headquarters
manages the day-to-day mining operations and focuses on the
overall strategic direction of the corporation. It is both incorporated and maintains its headquarters in Michigan. After Daimler AG v. Bauman, a plaintiff looking to sue the corporation on
1
an unrelated claim must bring a suit in Michigan.
Now imagine that business is booming and the company
2
seeks to diversify its assets and product lines. It does what
roughly eighty percent of Fortune 500 companies have already
3
done —it delegates the management of the day-to-day opera4
tion to divisional managers. The corporation establishes a divisional office in Virginia, where a bulk of its mining activities
take place. Although the Virginia office adopts part of the functions of a traditional corporate headquarters, a court would

* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 2011,
Wake Forest University; B.A. 2009, Wake Forest University. Thank you to
Dean Allan Erbsen for his guidance and advice in writing this Note; to Professor Eric Tostrud for his insights and willingness to discuss my various
thoughts. Thank you to my friends and colleagues on the Minnesota Law Review, in particular Eleanor Wood, Barbara Marchevsky, Evan Livermore, Kyle
Kroll, and Chris Bowler for their helpful feedback and improving my Article
with their edits in a way that I never could. Finally, and most importantly,
thank you to my family for their love and support. Copyright © 2016 by
Seungwon Chung.
1. 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
2. For further discussion on how the expansion of a corporation’s business affects its structure, see Neil Fligstein, The Spread of the Multidivisional
Form Among Large Firms, 1919–1979, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 377 (1985).
3. DUNCAN ANGWIN ET AL., THE STRATEGY PATHFINDER: CORE CONCEPTS AND LIVE CASES 108 (2011) (“By the late 1960s over 80% of the Fortune
500 companies were structured in [the multidivisional form] . . . . Now the Mform company is the most prevalent structure among large businesses.”).
4. See ROBERT E. HOSKISSON & MICHAEL A. HITT, DOWNSCOPING: HOW
TO TAME THE DIVERSIFIED FIRM 7–8 (1994).
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likely find that Virginia could not assert general jurisdiction
5
over the corporation.
This demonstrates that the current general jurisdiction
doctrine is ill-formulated to confront the nuances of corporate
organizational structure. The current doctrine only accounts for
6
a centralized corporate structure. This narrow doctrine exists,
in part, because the Court adopted the Hertz test for the principal place of business as part of its general jurisdiction rule,
7
and, with it, the inherent limitations of that test. The principal
8
place of business is a single location and, thus, if a corporation
divides the functions of its corporate headquarters between offices in multiple states, courts must choose between multiple
9
locations. That result is an imperfect answer because the general jurisdiction doctrine does not provide an explanation for
why a court must make this forced choice.
The trend toward decentralized corporate functions raises
the stakes of this mismatch between doctrine and corporate
practice. The multidivisional form (M-form) is the “most preva10
lent structure” in corporate organization. This structure separates its corporate headquarters from the management of its
day-to-day operations, sometimes placing each in a different
11
state. Thus, when courts confront jurisdictional questions involving these corporations, they “shoehorn a corporation into
12
an inappropriate description simply to apply a test.” They
simply do not consider that the corporation might be structured
13
differently than a traditional centralized headquarters. However, the courts are not the only ones that make this mistake.
5. See, e.g., Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221,
225–26 (2d Cir. 2014) (identifying the principal place of business as a single
location); Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (limiting the fora of general jurisdiction to the place of incorporation and principal
place of business).
6. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (pointing
out that the majority does not account for when “a corporation ‘divide[s] [its]
command and coordinating functions among officers who work at several different locations’” (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95–96 (2010))).
7. See id. at 760 (majority opinion).
8. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93.
9. Id. at 95–96.
10. ANGWIN ET AL., supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636
F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 2011).
12. See Rautenstrauch v. Stern/Leach Co., No. Civ.A 03-10723-DPW, 2004
WL 42573, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2004) (“[C]ourts must be careful to consider
the fit of model to reality . . . .”).
13. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.
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While scholarship has focused on the theoretical basis of
general jurisdiction, it does not consider how corporations
14
structure their organizations. This Note fills that gap. In the
business world, a well-known organizational concept is that
15
“structure follows strategy.” If corporations change their
16
structure in response to changes in their environment, courts
should behave in a similar manner and adjust their general jurisdiction doctrine. This Note proposes that the general jurisdiction doctrine should follow corporate structure. In particular, courts should exercise general jurisdiction in fora where a
corporation maintains its corporate functions, such as management of the day-to-day business and direction of overall corporate goals.
Part I examines the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine,
and discusses the theories that justify a state’s exercise of such
jurisdiction. Next, it describes the principal place of business
17
test from Hertz Corp. v. Friend which serves as a “paradigm
18
forum” of general jurisdiction. Part II analyzes various corporate organizational structures that the general jurisdiction doctrine does not address. In particular, it highlights that the reliance on the definition of a principal place of business from
Hertz infringes on state sovereignty. Part III introduces a defi2014); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014).
14. See, e.g., Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865 (2013); Patrick J.
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119;
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77; Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988); Allan Erbsen, Impersonal
Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1 (2010); Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State
Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81 (2013);
Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012); Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J. 1161 (2015); Philip B.
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Allan R. Stein, Styles
of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65
TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,
101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 637 (1988).
15. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN
THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 14 (1962) (“The thesis deduced
from these several propositions is then that structure follows strategy . . . .”).
16. See Julie Wulf, The Flattened Firm—Not as Advertised 3 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-087, 2012), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/
Publication%20Files/12-087_bc50bde2-3016-457a-9bee-dc988cb1056b.pdf.
17. 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
18. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
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nition of corporate function that would account for the variety
of ways corporations organize their business. This Note ultimately proposes that activities that fall within this definition
should confer general jurisdiction over a corporation and
demonstrates that the activities have a strong theoretical and
practical basis.
I. A TALE OF TWO EVOLUTIONS IN CORPORATE
GENERAL JURISDICTION: DOCTRINE AND
ORGANIZATION
The development of the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine is a two-part story: (1) the evolution of the personal jurisdiction rule governing corporations, which will be explained in
Section A; and (2) the progression of corporate organizational
theory, which will be explained in Section B below. These two
arcs take seemingly opposite paths. On one hand, general corporate jurisdiction evolved from a broad and encompassing doctrine to a significantly narrower version. On the other hand,
corporate structure theory transitioned from a narrow theory of
centralization to a sprawling and more decentralized scheme.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GENERAL JURISDICTION
If a corporation maintains certain minimum contact with
19
the forum state, a court may exercise general jurisdiction. The
20
basis of this authority is a state’s sovereignty. There are, however, limits on the state’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction over
a corporation: fairness considerations under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federalist struc21
ture. This Section begins by describing the inception of the
fairness standard in International Shoe. Then, it proceeds by
explaining the federalism limitation on personal jurisdiction.
Finally, this Section concludes by discussing how these broad
standards evolved into a more limited test in Goodyear and
Daimler.
19. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011)
(plurality opinion) (“[W]hether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on
whether the sovereign has authority to render it.”).
20. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293
(1980) (“[T]he Framers also intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try
causes in their courts.”); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18, at 19 (1834) (“[T]he laws of every state affect, and bind . . .
all persons, who are resident within it . . . .”).
21. See Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 1987).
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1. International Shoe: Playing Fair with General Jurisdiction
The modern era of personal jurisdiction emerged with the
22
canonical decision International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The
Supreme Court distinguished the types of contacts necessary to
hold a corporation “amenable to suits unrelated to that activi23
ty,” or general jurisdiction, from contacts that “give rise to the
24
liabilities sued on,” or specific jurisdiction. While “continuous
and systematic” activity might justify a suit arising from that
activity, only “continuous corporate operations” justifies gen25
eral jurisdiction. The difference between general and specific
jurisdiction centers on the focus of the contacts analysis. For
specific jurisdiction, the relationship between the dispute and
26
the forum state drives a court’s analysis. The court may only
27
decide issues that are related to the controversy before it. In
contrast, general jurisdiction is “dispute blind” and concerns
28
the relationship between the defendant and the forum state.
This all-purpose power allows courts to hear a dispute against
the defendant regardless of the content or where the conflict
29
originated. Due to the expansive reach of this jurisdiction,
courts view the threshold level of minimum contacts as “significantly higher” in general jurisdiction cases than in specific ju30
risdiction cases.
The primary regulator of this threshold is fairness. The
Due Process Clause “requires only that in order to subject a de22. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
23. Id. at 318.
24. Id. at 317.
25. Cf. id. at 318 (distinguishing “continuous activity of some sorts” which
does not confer general jurisdiction and “continuous corporate operations”
which does (emphasis added)).
26. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)
(“[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy normally
support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.”).
27. For a discussion of the meaning of “related” in the minimum contacts
analysis, see Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the
Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 867 (2012).
28. See Twitchell, supra note 14, at 627 (“General jurisdiction was dispute-blind—based on the relationship of either the plaintiff or the defendant
to the forum—whereas specific jurisdiction was dispute-specific.”).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d
773, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
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fendant to a judgment . . . [that] he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not of31
fend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Courts assess fairness to corporations in several ways. First,
they consider whether there is a burden of litigating in a dis32
tant forum. An extraordinary burden might be an indication
33
of a violation of Due Process. An example of such burdens is
34
the inconvenience of travel for the defendant. Modern transportation, however, and, in particular, discount airfare, makes
travel within the United States much easier today than in pre35
vious years. Additionally, the ease at which corporations can
find in-state counsel in a foreign state is facilitated by the
36
Internet. As a result, the burdens of distant litigation are not
as prevalent of a concern today as they might have been in the
past.
Second, courts also consider the predictability of the forum
for the defendant. Does the defendant have a reason to believe
that its activities in the forum will subject it to the authority of
the state’s courts? A tenet of jurisdiction is that corporations
should have an opportunity to structure their activities to avoid
37
the sovereign power of the forum state. Additionally, the predictability of a forum allows a corporation to “alleviate the risk
38
of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance.” A corpora31. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
32. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92
(1980).
33. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115–16
(1987) (finding general jurisdiction unreasonable because of the burden placed
on the defendant).
34. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317 (“An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or
principle place of business is relevant . . . .” (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930))).
35. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (“[M]odern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.”).
36. See Erbsen, supra note 14, at 24–25 (describing resources available for
finding out-of-state counsel); id. at 24 n.88.
37. See Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“The Due Process Clause . . . allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)
(same).
38. Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. For a further discussion on insurance
and its relationship to litigation burdens, see Erbsen, supra note 14, at 22
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tion, however, might only believe that it can reasonably be sued
in the forum state because of its prior experience in court, not
39
through some independent subjective belief.
In assessing the predictability of the forum, courts also
look to see if the corporation has “purposely avail[ed] itself of
40
the privilege of conducting activities with the forum State.” If
a corporation has “invoke[ed] the benefits and protections of the
41
forum’s law,” a suit against a corporation might be justified.
This is because a state can extract special responsibilities from
42
its citizens even when they are absent from the state. For example, a state can tax its citizens for income that they obtain
from out-of-state activities. In essence, a state offers its protection and police powers in return for the authority to subject a
corporation to its adjudicatory power. Reciprocal benefits and
burdens offer a strong basis for the state’s exercise of adjudica43
tory authority.
Over time, the International Shoe jurisdiction evolved and,
despite this high bar for exercising general jurisdiction, courts
began to treat general jurisdiction as “an imperfect safety valve
that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in
44
cases when specific jurisdiction would deny it.” They supported this broad scope of general jurisdiction by searching for the
45
“approximate physical presence” of the corporation. A corporan.79.
39. See Oral Argument at 4:18, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746
(2014) (No. 11-965), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/11-965 (describing Mercedes-Benz USA’s assumption that there was general jurisdiction over it).
40. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2004)
(indicating that “both theories of personal jurisdiction” require purposeful
availment).
41. Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987).
42. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (“[T]he authority of a
state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence
from the state. The state which accords him privileges and affords protection
to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties.”).
43. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 733 (“On balance, the reciprocal
benefits and burdens rationale provides the most satisfactory basis for the
state’s exercise of coercive power.”). Contra Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of
“Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 537 (2012)
(“[A]ssessing an appropriate level of reciprocal benefits to justify general jurisdiction seems particularly arbitrary.”).
44. Borchers, supra note 14, at 139; see also Twitchell, supra note 14, at
632–33 (suggesting that courts use general jurisdiction when specific jurisdiction is proper).
45. See, e.g., King v. Am. Family Mutual Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir.
2011); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., 647 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011);
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tion, however, can only manifest its “presence” by “activities
carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for
46
it.” Accordingly, courts determined if a corporation was “present” by assessing its attributes such as: (1) an office or employees; (2) sales in the state; (3) solicitations of business in the
state; (4) bank accounts; (5) the appointment of an agent for
service of process; and (6) registration to do business in the
47
state. This expansive view of general jurisdiction, which dominated the courts for decades, would soon begin to be slowly
clawed back.
2. Volkswagen: Our Federalist Limitation on General
Jurisdiction
Several decades after International Shoe, the Supreme
Court emphasized the limitation on the grasp of state sover48
eignty arising from the federalist structure. Under the Consti49
tution, the fifty states are coequals in dignity and authority.
The ability of a particular state to adjudicate a controversy im50
plicates the interest of other states. For example, if a plaintiff
brings a suit in one state, other states might be precluded from
51
hearing the case. Therefore, a state’s inappropriate assertion
Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“[General jurisdiction] contacts must be so extensive to be tantamount to SSBO France being constructively present in the state . . . .”); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.
2000); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (“Here
the activities of the defendant corporations in South Carolina, although possibly sufficient to constitute ‘presence’ are nonetheless minimal.”).
46. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This common
misunderstanding about corporate “presence” has led some plaintiffs to conflate a corporation’s “presence” with the presence of a high-level officer in the
state. See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014).
47. See, e.g., Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Group) Co., 701 F.3d 598, 620
(10th Cir. 2012); Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688
F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2012); King, 632 F.3d at 579; Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647
F.3d at 1225; Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG,
646 F.3d 589, 597–98 (8th Cir. 2011); Negron-Torres v. Verizon Commc’ns,
Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2007).
48. For further discussion of the limitations of state power set by federalism, see Erbsen, supra note 14.
49. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980) (“[Minimum contacts] act[] to ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”).
50. See Erbsen, supra note 14, at 63.
51. See id. at 63 n.254 (describing the implications of modern preclusion
law).
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of jurisdiction “upset[s] the federal balance, which posits that
each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful in52
trusion by other States.”
With these state sovereignty considerations in mind, per53
sonal jurisdiction cases present an allocation problem. The relationship between the defendant and the forum state determines whether the allocation of personal jurisdiction in one
state undermines the interest of other states. Consider, for example, the citizenship of the defendant. A state has a strong in54
terest in regulating the activities of its citizens. As a result, a
state raises a federalism concern when it subjects a citizen of
55
another state to the power of its tribunals. This does not mean
that all efforts by a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over
another state’s citizen offend notions of federalism. States can
exercise limited jurisdiction over causes of action related to ac56
tivities within the state.
3. Goodyear and Daimler: “Home” Is Where General
Jurisdiction Is
Though the general jurisdiction doctrine was constrained
by concerns of fairness and federalism, in Goodyear Dunlop
57
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court further
confined the general jurisdiction doctrine. After Goodyear, a
court may only exercise general jurisdiction over a corporation
“when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
58
State.” Recently, the Supreme Court solidified its rejection of
the broad approach discussed above, describing it as “unaccept52. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011).
53. See Erbsen, supra note 14, at 66 (“To say that a given exercise of personal jurisdiction is unconstitutional is thus to say that a state has usurped
authority that belongs elsewhere.”).
54. See STORY, supra note 20, § 21, at 22 (“[Y]et every nation has a right
to bind its own subjects by its own laws in every other place.”).
55. See Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“[T]here are the federalism concerns of state sovereignty—in which we inquire about the power of one state to subject to its process the citizen of another state.”).
56. Id. at 377 (“The concerns that injuries might occur in the state or
might somehow implicate Texas component-part manufacturers are adequately protected. Beech is subject to the specific jurisdiction of Texas courts when
its product causes injuries . . . in Texas.”).
57. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
58. Id. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317
(1945)).
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59

ably grasping,” and narrowed the scope of the doctrine. Instead, the Court made clear that “only a limited set of affiliations” can overcome the high threshold for general jurisdic60
tion. In doing so, the Court relied on developments in specific
61
jurisdiction to fill the holes left by a narrower rule. Under the
current doctrine, general jurisdiction over corporate defendants
is proper “when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in
62
the forum State.” The place of incorporation and the principal
63
place of business are “paradigm” examples of such affiliations.
64
Scholarship has addressed theories of general jurisdiction, in
65
particular, the meaning of “at home.” This Part, however, does
not recap those explanations. Instead, it explores the justifications behind the fora associated with being “at home”: the state
66
of incorporation and the principal place of business.
a. The Basis for the State of Incorporation
As a “creature[] of state law,” each corporation holds a spe67
cial relationship with its place of incorporation. A corporation
can only possess the properties and powers that its charter con59. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
60. Id. at 760 (“Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations
with a forum will render a defendant amendable to all-purpose jurisdiction
there.”).
61. See id. at 757–58 (“Specific jurisdiction has been cut loose from
Pennoyer’s sway . . . . As this Court has increasingly trained on [specific jurisdiction], general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place in the
contemporary scheme.” (citation omitted)); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D.
Freer, Be Careful What You Wish for: Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration
of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001, 2003 (2014) (“Specific
jurisdiction has received the lion’s share of the Court’s attention . . . .”).
62. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851).
63. Id. at 754 (“With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation
and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’” (quoting Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 735)).
64. See supra note 14.
65. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 14, at 86; Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is
Home Depot “At Home”?: Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business
Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 259–62 (2014); James R. Pielemeier,
Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of General Personal
Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 987–91 (2012); Stein, supra note
43, at 528 (“This Article will attempt to . . . construe the ‘essentially at home’
standard . . . .”).
66. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
67. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of
state law . . . .”); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587–88
(1839) (“[A] corporation is the mere creature of a law of the state . . . .”).
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68

fers upon it. This dependence upon state law subjects a corpo69
ration to the “most complete and penetrating regulation.” The
state of incorporation is the “only one State [that has] the au70
thority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs.” Since a
corporation incorporates in a single state, a corporation’s relationship with that state is unique. This relationship provides
both the corporation and the state with several benefits.
When deciding where to incorporate, corporations base
71
their decision on the benefits that each state provides them.
Some states, like Delaware, provide the corporations and
72
shareholders “maximum flexibility in ordering their affairs.”
Corporate law in these states also differs on issues such as the
73
voting rights of stockholders. Empirical evidence demonstrates that these differences drive a corporation’s decision to
74
incorporate in that state. But the street goes both ways.
75
States can create a lucrative industry. Income received from
76
corporation franchise taxes funds the state budget. For example, a quarter of Delaware’s budget is generated from the in77
corporation industry. As a result, the Delaware legislature

68. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 497, 558 (1844).
69. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949).
70. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (describing the internal affairs doctrine).
71. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 156
(11th ed. 2010) (“Selection of the state of incorporation involves an appraisal of
two factors: (a) a dollars-and-cents analysis . . . and (b) a consideration of the
advantages and disadvantages of the substantive corporation laws of these
states.”).
72. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 2
(2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf.
73. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.471, subdiv. 1 (2015) (providing appraisal rights in a wide variety of circumstances), with DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262 (2015) (providing dissenter rights only in mergers).
74. See generally Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) (describing how corporate laws affect migration of corporations).
75. See Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how
-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html (“Delaware’s tax laws are a
bonanza for the state . . . . Delaware collected roughly $860 million in taxes
and fees . . . in 2011.”).
76. BLACK, supra note 72, at 1.
77. Wayne, supra note 75 (“That money accounted for a quarter of the
state’s total budget.”).
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maintains the incorporation laws at “state-of-the-art” level. In
this sense, there is a vested interest by the general public of the
state in the corporations incorporated in the state. This bolsters
the notion that a corporation might be a political insider, and,
79
therefore, properly subjected to jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the benefits of a state of incorporation are far
reaching. In a dispute against a corporation, the law of the
state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corpo80
ration. Even if a corporation operates in a foreign state, the
laws of its state of incorporation still protect the corporation’s
81
decisions. Therefore, corporations cannot make decisions
82
without extending the power of those decisions nationally.
Incorporation provides convenience for the corporation.
Given that the corporation based its incorporation decision, in
83
part, on the state’s laws, it is fair to assume that the corpora84
tion is familiar with those laws. In combination with this familiarity, the courts of the state might provide the corporation
with a considerable advantage. The Delaware courts, for example, are considered some of the most experienced and capable
85
courts for adjudicating corporate issues. In fact, a corporation
86
might prefer to be sued in these courts.
Familiarity with a state’s courts alone cannot justify all87
purpose jurisdiction. For instance, a hostile corporation or in78. BLACK, supra note 72, at 1.
79. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 742–43.
80. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d
1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) (“It is now well established that only the law of the
state of incorporation governs and determines issues relating to a corporation’s internal affairs.”).
81. See Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate
Internal Affairs, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 164 (1985) (“The statute thus
directs that Delaware law be applied to Delaware corporations, a directive
presumably applicable not only to Delaware courts but to courts of other jurisdictions as well.”).
82. The Full Faith and Credit Clause also regulates the choice of law. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1.
83. See supra notes 71 and 74 and accompanying text.
84. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 734.
85. See BLACK, supra note 72, at 5.
86. Id. at 7 (“[A corporation’s general counsel] told me that, if his corporation is going to be sued anyway, he would far prefer to litigate in the Court of
Chancery . . . .”).
87. See Pl. AstraZeneca AB’s Opposition to Def. Mylan Pharm. Inc.’s Mot.
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at 10, AstraZeneca, AB v. Mylan
Pharm. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (2014) (No. 14-00696-GMS), 2014 WL 4745281
(“Mylan has made itself at home in Delaware district court.”).
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dividual can draw a corporation into a protracted battle requiring frequent litigation. Such a scenario is not so farfetched.
Consider the patent dispute between Samsung and Apple,
which spanned nineteen lawsuits in twelve courts in nine coun88
tries on four continents. A large number of these suits take
89
place in California. Constant litigation is part of Apple’s busi90
ness strategy, and, as a result, Samsung might find itself in
91
court again and again. If frequent litigation is sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, Apple’s litigation would effectively
bring Samsung under California’s adjudicatory authority. The
Supreme Court rejected this precise process of unilateral juris92
diction “creation.” Thus, a corporation must have a stronger
relationship with a forum state than a mere use of the state’s
institutions.
b. The Principal Place of Business
One such relationship is the principal place of business.
Traditionally, domicile provides a strong justification for a
93
state’s exercise of general jurisdiction. Aside from the state of
incorporation, the principal place of business is the closest in94
carnation of a corporation’s domicile. A court may exercise
general jurisdiction even if a corporation only maintains its
95
principal place of business in the state temporarily. In identi-

88. Chloe Albanesius, Every Place Samsung and Apple Are Suing Each
Other, PC MAG. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,
2392920,00.asp.
89. Id.
90. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444358404577
609810658082898 (“Apple’s legal campaign is partly aimed at trying to beat
back the gangbuster growth of Android . . . .”).
91. See Josh Lowensohn, Round Two: Apple and Samsung Suit Up for
Another Billion Dollar Patent War, VERGE (Mar. 31, 2014) http://www
.theverge.com/2014/3/31/5564134/round-two-apple-and-samsung-suit-up-for
-another-billion-dollar-patent.
92. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 314
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basis for the assertion of jurisdiction is
not the happenstance that an individual over whom petitioner had no control
made a unilateral decision to take a chattel with him to a distant State.”).
93. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 730 (“Domicile is traditionally
the strongest basis supporting general jurisdiction over a party.”).
94. Id. at 733–34.
95. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984)
(“Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business so that
Ohio jurisdiction was proper even over a cause of action unrelated to the activities in the State.”).

Chung_4FMT

1612

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1599

fying the principal places of business as a paradigm forum, the
Court explicitly referenced Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the seminal
96
case defining corporation citizenship. To understand the rationale behind the principal place of business, it is important to
examine the evolution of the Hertz test and its justifications.
From the inception of corporations, these entities presented a unique problem for jurisdictional questions because they
97
are artificial creatures of law. In its early encounters with the
problem of corporate citizenship, the Supreme Court concluded
98
that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation.
Concerns, however, about corporation’s ability to “manipulate
federal-court jurisdiction” led Congress to modify the definition
99
of corporate citizenship in the diversity statute. As a result,
Congress amended the diversity statute to include “the princi100
pal place of business.”
Prior to Hertz, the federal courts experimented with a variety of tests for determining the corporation’s “principal place of
business.” The major difference between these tests is that
some focus on the center of a corporation’s business activity,
while others focus on the corporation’s center of its policymak101
ing. Courts have applied three tests to determine a corpora102
tion’s principal place of business.
First, utilizing the nerve center test, courts look for the
corporation’s nerve center from which “its officers direct, control and coordinate all activities without regard to locale, in the
96. Compare Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (citing
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010)), with Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) (lacking a reference to
Hertz).
97. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law . . . .”); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587–
88 (1839) (“[A] corporation is the mere creature of a law of the state . . . .”).
98. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 497, 558 (1844) (“[A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state . . . for the purposes of its incorporation, [is] capable of being
treated as a citizen of that state . . . .”).
99. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 86.
100. Id. at 88.
101. See Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 835–
36 (8th Cir. 2004) (focusing on the location of a corporation’s business activities); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 787 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The
principal place of business—under the law of this circuit anyway—is where
the corporation’s nerve center is.”); Lugo-Vina v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 574 F.2d
41, 43 (1st Cir. 1978) (focusing on the location of a corporation’s policymaking
activities).
102. See Capitol Indem. Corp., 367 F.3d at 835.
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103

furtherance of the corporate objective.” In Scot Typewriter Co.
v. Underwood Corp., a plaintiff sued a manufacturer of type104
writers in New York. The corporation maintained three man105
ufacturing plants, but none in New York. The defendant,
however, supervised and coordinated all of its activities out of
106
an office in New York. Therefore, the court concluded that the
New York constituted the defendant’s principal place of busi107
ness.
Second, under the corporate activities test, a corporation’s
principal place of business exists where there is “a substantial
108
predominance of corporate activity.” In Inland Rubber Corp.
v. Triple A Tire Service, Inc., the court focused on the corporation’s “day-to-day control of Inland’s sales operations” in New
109
York. Additionally, the court noted that officers in New York
were “in general charge of Inland’s operations in New York and
110
Florida.” In other words, the corporate activities test looks for
111
where the corporation’s day-to-day management takes place.
Finally, the locus of the operations test focuses on where
the majority of the corporation’s actual physical operations
112
were located. This test is comparative. It considers the location of the corporation’s employees, tangible property, production activities, sources of income, and where sales take place,
and then compares the magnitude of those activities in the fo113
rum state with the corporation’s nationwide activities. The
corporation’s principal place of business is located in the state
with the greatest amount of activity. The Supreme Court found
103. Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). For a further discussion of the nerve center test, see Lindsey
D. Saunders, Note, Determining a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business: A
Uniform Approach to Diversity Jurisdiction, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1475, 1479
(2006).
104. Scot Typewriter Co., 170 F. Supp. at 864.
105. Id. (describing the locations of the manufacturing plants in Connecticut, New Jersey and California).
106. Id. (“[The corporation’s] executive activities [in New York include]
over-all supervision and coordination of all functional operations.”).
107. Id. at 865.
108. Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir.
2001).
109. 220 F. Supp. 490, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
110. Id. at 492.
111. See, e.g., de Walker v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 569 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir.
1978); Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960).
112. See, e.g., Inland Rubber Corp., 220 F. Supp. at 492.
113. Id.

Chung_4FMT

1614

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1599

this test “unusually difficult to apply” due to the diversity of
114
Courts assigned each factor varying importance
factors.
115
which resulted in unpredictable application of the test.
Provided with these standards, the Supreme Court considered the “nerve center” test superior to the alternatives for
116
three reasons. First, the text of the diversity statute supported a narrow and singular approach to the principal place of
117
118
business. The word “place” is singular, not plural. Additionally, “principal” denotes a location that is first in rank, and,
119
therefore, must reside in a single location. Second, the test
120
promotes administrative simplicity. The corporate headquarters is “easily ascertainable” and promotes greater predictabil121
ity. Predictability allows corporations to make better business
122
and investment decisions. Finally, the nerve center test prevents the comparative problem of the gross income test rejected
123
by Congress.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Even as the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine trended
toward the simpler and narrower interpretation, corporate
structure took the opposite journey—going from a straightforward era of centralization to the complex and multifaceted theory of diversification and decentralization. This Section describes the evolution of corporate structure, including a
detailed look at the rationale behind each transition.
1. The Centralization of Corporate Authority
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the unitary
form, or U-form, was the dominant configuration of corpora114. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 90 (2010).
115. Cf. R. G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655–57
(2d Cir. 1979) (noting that courts emphasize different factors depending on
whether the corporate operations span many states or are more centralized).
116. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93 (“Three sets of considerations, taken together,
convince us that this approach, while imperfect, is superior to other possibilities.”).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 94.
121. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (explaining that
clear jurisdictional rules provide greater certainty).
122. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94.
123. Id. at 95.
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124

tions. U-form corporations rely on heavily centralized structures, often organized along functional lines (such as sales, fi125
nances, and manufacturing). Power is extremely concentrated
in a U-form corporation. High-level corporate officers make all
126
of the long-term planning and daily operating decisions. These officers are concerned with two activities: maintaining the
long-run health of the company and the smooth and efficient
127
day-to-day operation. The next layer of management consists
of the “functional areas of the firm” like “production, market128
ing, personnel and finance.”
This corporate structure gained prominence in response to
the need for a strong centralization in the manufacturing industry—by integrating and streamlining production and distribution, U-form companies benefited from the economies of
129
This strategy made lots of sense for single prodscale.
uct/industry companies like General Motors and DuPont Explosive Powder Company. The U-form structure provides these
corporations with several advantages. First, it streamlines
130
communication within the corporation along functional lines.
The production function of a corporation is handled entirely by
a production manager rather than being dispersed among
many officers. The second advantage is that the U-form allows
for the specialization in a single functional area in each de131
partment. As a result, the production department is only required to understand the details of production and no other
132
field. The advantages of the U-form, however, diminish as the
business begins to grow.
When faced with entry into multiple markets and a requirement for various expertise, the corporate officers tend to

124. See ANGWIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 107–08. For a discussion of a classic case study of the U-form, see CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 52–113.
125. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 133 (1975).
126. See ROBERT F. FREELAND, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 12 (2001); MARIA MOSCHANDREAS, BUSINESS ECONOMICS
54–55 (2d ed. 2000) (“The CEO is responsible for both long-term (strategic) decisions and the day-to-day running of the functions.”).
127. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9.
128. MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 54.
129. See J. BARKLEY ROSSER, JR. & MARINA V. ROSSER, COMPARATIVE
ECONOMICS IN A TRANSFORMING WORLD ECONOMY 127–28 (2d ed. 2004).
130. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 55.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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133

be overburdened and overstretched by the U-form structure.
This process results in a coordination problem where the highlevel officers must rely on imperfect information to command
134
the business of the corporation. Eventually for General Motors and DuPont, these difficulties led to the rise of a decentral135
ized structure known as the multidivisional form.
2. The Rise of Multidivisional Corporations
Faced with the limitations of the U-form structure, companies like DuPont and General Motors adapted their businesses
by decentralizing the management and control functions of
136
their businesses. Today, the multidivisional form is “the preferred organizational form for the large firms that dominate the
137
American economy” and, to some, the “most important single
innovation [for American capitalism] of the twentieth centu138
ry.” The M-form decentralized core managing operations into
139
departments. It separates the strategic decision-making from
the day-to-day operating decisions handled by the corporate offices in a U-form structure by delegating the latter to divi140
sions.
133. See FREELAND, supra note 126; see also CHANDLER, supra note 15, at
299 (“[T]he problems of coordination, appraisal, and policy formulation [become] too intricate for a small number of top officers to handle both long-run,
entrepreneurial, and short-run, operational administrative activities.”).
134. See Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, Coordinating Tasks in M-Form and
U-Form Organisations 3 (Suntory Ctr., Discussion Paper No. TE/03/458,
2003), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3746/1/Coordinating_Tasks_in_M-Form_and_U
-Form_Organisations.pdf; see also CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 91 (“The essential difficulty was that diversification greatly increased the demands on
[DuPont’s] administrative offices.”).
135. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 104–13 (describing how the strategy
of diversification led to the formation of a “decentralized,” multidivisional corporate form).
136. Id. at 52–162 (describing the evolution of the multidivisional structure
in DuPont and General Motors).
137. Fligstein, supra note 2, at 388.
138. Joseph T. Mahoney, The Adoption of the Multidivisional Form of Organization: A Contingency Model, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 49, 49 (1992) (quoting
Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion, Organization Form, and the
Multi-division Hypothesis, in THE CORPORATE ECONOMY 382 (Robin Marris &
Adrian Wood eds., 1971)).
139. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Functions of the HQ Unit in the
Multibusiness Firm, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 31, 33 (1991) (“The M-form came
into being when senior managers operating through existing centralized, functionally departmentalized U-Form structures realized that they had neither
the time nor the necessary information to coordinate and monitor day-to-day
operations . . . .”).
140. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56.
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M-form corporations have three levels of autonomous
planning and administrative offices: the corporate headquar141
ters, the division, and the business unit. The role of the corporation headquarters in an M-form corporation is the
“coordinat[ion], apprais[al], and plan[ning of] goals and poli142
cies” and the “allocat[ion of] resources.” Therefore, the general office maintains strategic decision-making and control of
143
the operating divisions.
The corporate office’s control is not absolute. The divisional
offices function as “semi-autonomous” entities responsible for
144
its own set of operating decisions. In fact, the corporate office
is not involved with “routine functional activities within these
145
Each division is responsible for coordinating and
units.”
146
managing the corporation’s business within its designation.
147
This function is handled by the division’s headquarters. Fi148
nally, these divisions can be based on a geographical area or
149
be product related.
The M-form structure provides three major advantages.
First, it shifts the burden of day-to-day management from the
150
general office to the divisional units. This process allows the
141. See Chandler, supra note 139, at 34.
142. CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9.
143. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56 (“The general office is assigned responsibilities of strategic decision making and control of operating
divisions.”).
144. See id.
145. Mahoney, supra note 138, at 50. Contra Laura Poppo, The Visible
Hands of Hierarchy Within the M-Form: An Empirical Test of Corporate Parenting of Internal Product Exchanges, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 403, 405 (2003)
(“[W]e develop a theory of selective corporate involvement, which describes
when corporate staff is most likely to involve itself in divisional matters . . . .”).
146. Chandler, supra note 139 (“The divisional offices coordinated production and distribution (and often product development) using the U-form structure.”).
147. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9–10 (“The departmental headquarters in its turn coordinates, appraises, and plans for a number of field units.”).
148. See GRANT FLEMING ET AL., THE BIG END OF TOWN: BIG BUSINESS
AND CORPORATE LEADERSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AUSTRALIA 163 (2004)
(“Divisions may be organised by product, customers, geography or related
business units (or a combination of these).”).
149. See Company Structure, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/
about-jnj/company-structure (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (describing Johnson &
Johnson’s company structure as a division between consumer healthcare, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals).
150. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56. For an example of why
this burden-shifting is necessary, see Jay R. Galbraith, The Evolution of Enterprise Organization Designs, 1 J. ORG. DESIGN, no. 2, 2012, at 1, 4 (describ-

Chung_4FMT

1618

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1599

general office to focus on the strategic decisions that might
151
make the corporation successful in the long run. Second, the
expertise and closer contact of the divisional managers with the
152
day-to-day business promotes speed and efficiency.
Finally, the M-form provides the corporation with growth
potential and economic benefits. Although the extent of those
153
benefits are debatable, corporations view the shift to a multidivisional structure as “the best way for them to manage con154
tinuous growth and complexity.” In fact, the multidivisional
form is considered “American capitalism’s most important sin155
gle innovation of the twentieth century.” Studies confirm that
the M-form provides corporations with innovative power and
156
flexibility.
3. The Final Evolution: Multisubsidiary Corporations
As Daimler demonstrates, corporations can also take the
multisubsidiary form, dividing its products and operations be157
tween multiple different subsidiaries. Changes in corporate
ing the burdens of the cell-division model on the corporate headquarters); see
also FREELAND, supra note 126 (“[Divisionalization] reduce[s] overload at the
top by clarifying lines of authority and communication.”).
151. See Mahoney, supra note 138, at 50 (“The M-form is viewed from the
efficiency perspective as in institutional response to problems of interdependence . . . .”); see also Poppo, supra note 145, at 404 (“[C]orporate staff cannot be
overburdened with the specific information relevant to operating divisions and
should instead focus on long-term strategic decisions that maximize the overall
profit of the firm.”).
152. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56; see also Donald A. Palmer
et al., Late Adoption of the Multidivisional Form by Large U.S. Corporations:
Institutional, Political, and Economic Accounts, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 100, 102–03
(1993) (describing the economic rationale behind the M-form structure).
153. See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 119; Charles W. L. Hill, Internal Organization and Enterprise Performance: Some UK Evidence, 6 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 210, 214 (1985) (“The results significantly demonstrate the superior profitability of M-form firms.”). Contra Robert F. Freeland,
The Myth of the M-Form? Governance, Consent, and Organizational Change,
102 AM. J. SOC. 483, 518 (1996) (“[The] mythical M-form offers a prescription
for economic decline.”).
154. ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 324:25,
Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2016).
155. Williamson, supra note 138.
156. See generally Robert E. Hoskisson et al., The Multidivisional Structure: Organizational Fossil or Source of Value?, 19 J. MGMT. 269 (1993) (evaluating the economic benefits of the M-form structure); Yingyi Qian et al., Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations (Working Paper No.
284,
1999),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.116
.7838&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
157. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014).
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tax laws facilitated the transformation of multidivisional corpo158
rations to multisubsidiary (MSF) corporations. The M-form
usually consists of a parent firm that is organized as divisions
159
based on product lines. In contrast, the MSF is defined as
“involving two or more levels of subsidiaries with a parent
160
company at the top.”
In order to understand the difference between the M-form
and MSF, it is important to first understand the difference between a division and a subsidiary. A division is generally characterized as:
[Being] 100 percent owned by the parent firm and distinguished as
holding its assets as operating units . . . under central office control . . . . [I]t does not have its own central office, nor does it have its
own board and officers. Most importantly, it does not issue or hold
161
stock.

In contrast, a subsidiary is a “separate legal entity . . . .
[and is] financially controlled to the extent that its ownership
162
by the parent company is equal to or exceeds 51 percent.” As
a result, the subsidiary is decoupled from the parent company
163
which protects the corporation’s assets. The subsidiary has
164
its own board and its own corporate office.
Therefore, the critical characteristic that differentiates the
M-form from the multisubsidiary form is control over the operating units. In an M-form corporation, the corporation maintains the authority to manage the day-to-day operations of the
corporation. Instead of exercising that power, the corporation
delegates that management to the divisional office. On the other hand, the subsidiary in a multisubsidiary corporation con-

158. See John Boies & Harland Prechel, Capital Dependence, Business Political Behavior, and Change to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form, 49 SOC.
PROBS. 301, 308 (2002) (“[Capitalists and managers] redefined corporations’
institutional arrangements by changing corporate tax laws in a way that facilitated the transformation of divisions into subsidiaries . . . .”).
159. See Mary Zey & Tami Swenson, The Transformation and Survival of
Fortune 500 Industrial Corporations Through Mergers and Acquisitions, 1981–
1995, 42 SOC. Q. 461, 464–65 (2001) [hereinafter Survival of Fortune 500 Industrial Corporations].
160. Mary Zey & Tami Swenson, The Transformation of the Dominant Corporate Form from Multidivisional to Multisubsidiary: The Role of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, 40 SOC. Q. 241, 243 (1999).
161. Id. at 244.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Survival of Fortune 500 Industrial Corporations, supra note 159,
at 465.
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165

trols its own day-to-day operations. Although the subsidiary
may be a separate legal entity, it is also financially dependent
166
on its parent company.
Berkshire Hathaway illustrates the complexity of the con167
trol issue. As a conglomerate, it fully owns its subsidiaries.
The basic function of the corporate headquarters in a conglom168
erate is a budgetary one. In Berkshire Hathaway, for example, Warren Buffett makes “[i]nvestment decisions and all other
capital allocation decisions” while operating decisions are left to
169
the various Berkshire businesses. The subsidiary’s corporate
functions are technically independent from its parent company
while, at the same time, the subsidiary is financially dependent
on the parent company.
Given this complexity, whether a conglomerate can avail
itself to general jurisdiction through the actions of its subsidi170
aries is a question of agency not personal jurisdiction. Such a
discussion is outside of the parameters of this Note. Instead,
the key question is whether any corporate activity of the parent
company is delegated to the subsidiaries. As with every jurisdictional assessment, the answer to this question is fact dependent. Generally, the conglomerate’s day-to-day operations is
the purchase of and investment in its subsidiaries. On the other hand, the conglomerate functions similarly to an M-form
171
structure, with various products and regional divisions. If,
however, the subsidiary exercises control over the parent company’s day-to-day business, the conglomerate would present a
172
similar challenge that the multidivisional structure presents.
165. Asli M. Colpan & Takashi Hikino, Foundations of Business Groups:
Towards an Integrated Framework, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS
GROUPS 15, 29 (Asli Colpan et al. eds., 2010), https://books.google.com/
books?id=RL2pWCa9Z24C&source=gbs_navlinks_s.
166. See JONATHAN W. FOWLER & KURT A. STRASSER, BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 59.04[A] (2014) (“[When] the subsidiary has not accomplished its own financing but is funded by the parent or the group, the subsidiary is dependent on its parent for advances either for working capital or for
continuing in business . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
167. Colpan & Hikino, supra note 165, at 29.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. For a discussion on whether a wholly owned subsidiary can be attributed to the parent, see Burt Neuborne, General Jurisdiction, “Corporate
Separateness,” and the Rule of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 95 (2013).
171. See PETER G. KLEIN, THE CAPITALIST & THE ENTREPRENEUR 42 (2010)
(“[T]he conglomerate could emerge only after the multidivisional structure had
been diffused widely throughout the corporate sector.”).
172. See supra Part I.B.2.
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II. THE CURRENT GENERAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The corporate general jurisdiction doctrine does not account for the reality of corporate structure. Courts assume that
corporations are monolithic creatures. The history of corporate
organization shows, however, that corporations come in all
shapes and sizes. Since the early 1900s, large corporations have
transitioned away from a centralized headquarter towards a
decentralized approach by delegating management authority to
173
divisional offices. This development presents a jurisdictional
problem. Part A analyzes how the courts assess the principal
place of business in the personal jurisdiction context. These
courts assume that a corporation’s principal place of business is
the same as it is in the diversity context. Part A concludes that
this assumption is improper. For personal jurisdiction cases,
courts should not blindly adopt the Hertz test, which is meant
to determine citizenship for diversity jurisdiction, because that
approach imposes the diversity statute’s limitations on personal jurisdiction. As Part B explains, the corporate general jurisdiction, which emphasizes the principal place of business, falls
short when accounting for corporate structures other than the
centralized U-form. Thus, this Part concludes that corporate
organizational structure makes a limited definition of a principal place of business unworkable.
A. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS
Despite the Hertz test’s wide adoption by courts, it faces
174
limitations. In fact, the Supreme Court agrees. This Section
analyzes how courts have adopted the principal place of business test in personal jurisdiction cases. After concluding that
courts use the test no differently in diversity cases, this Section
assesses the differences between the diversity cases and personal jurisdiction. It concludes that the principal place of business faces different constraints in the personal jurisdiction context than in the diversity context.

173. See WILSON B. BROWN, MARKETS, ORGANIZATIONS AND INFORMATION:
BEYOND THE DICHOTOMIES OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 75–77 (1992) (describing the origins of the unitary form).
174. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010) (describing the Hertz test
as an “imperfect” approach).
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1. The Principal Place of Business in the General Jurisdiction
Context
The current general jurisdiction rule requires courts to de175
termine the corporation’s principal place of business. Some
courts explicitly adopted the Hertz test in order to locate a cor176
poration’s principal place of business. Although other courts
did not adopt the Hertz test, those courts identified the princi177
pal place of business as the corporate headquarters. Courts
did not consider whether the Hertz test is inappropriate for a
personal jurisdiction analysis. As a result, courts currently
treat the principal place of business in general jurisdiction cas178
es in a similar manner as they assess it in diversity cases.
2. Differences Between Diversity Jurisdiction and Personal
Jurisdiction
There are substantial differences between diversity jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. First and foremost, statutory
179
limitations restrict the scope of diversity jurisdiction. The
Constitution provides the judiciary the power that “shall extend to . . . Controversies . . . between Citizens of different
180
states.” It does not, however, “automatically confer diversity
181
jurisdiction upon the federal courts.” Only Congress can authorize and determine the scope of the federal court jurisdic182
tion. The outer limit of the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction is set by the diversity statute.
In contrast, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
175. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
176. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., No. 1:14 CV
329, slip op. at 4 n.3 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2014) (“The Supreme Court has defined a corporation’s principal place of business as its ‘nerve center’ . . . . ‘In
practice it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its
headquarters . . . .’” (quoting Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93)); Flynn v. Hovensa,
LLC, No. 3:14 Civ. 43, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Penn. July 3, 2014) (“A corporation’s
principal place of business is its ‘nerve center.’”).
177. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.
2014); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221, 225–26
(2d Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.
2014).
178. Compare Gucci, 768 F.3d at 122 (personal jurisdiction case), with
Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101 (4th
Cir. 2011) (diversity jurisdiction case).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
181. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 84.
182. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1922).
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Amendment limits the power of personal jurisdiction. Even if
it is constitutionally permissible for a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a corporation, that court might still lack the
power to hear the case. The Due Process Clause only defines
184
the outer boundary of permissible judicial power. Similar to
the diversity statute, the state legislature must authorize the
185
courts to exercise that jurisdiction. In most states, the long186
arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause.
Additionally, the doctrines serve vastly different purposes.
The primary purpose, for instance, of diversity jurisdiction is to
open federal courts’ doors to those who might suffer from local
187
prejudice against out-of-state parties. Congress believed that
a corporation has a fair chance to avoid local prejudice if it has
an established center of business within the state. Another impetus for Congress’ modification of the diversity statute to include “principal place of business” was the increased size of the
188
federal docket. Corporations manipulated their state of incorporation to obtain diversity jurisdiction, and, as a result, these
189
cases flooded the federal docket. In light of this pressing concern, Congress widened the definition of corporate citizenship
under the diversity statute in order to prevent clogging of the
federal docket with corporation diversity cases.
As discussed earlier, the limitations of general jurisdiction

183. See supra Part I.B.1.
184. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2853 (2011) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to proceed against a
defendant.”).
185. See Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1st
Cir. 1990) (“[T]he district court’s personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is governed by the forum’s long-arm statute.” (quoting American Express Int’l Inc. v. Mendez-Capellan, 889 F.2d 1175, 1178 (1st Cir. 1989)));
Savin v. Ranier, 898 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[F]ederal courts must look
to the forum state’s long-arm statute to determine if personal jurisdiction may
be obtained over a nonresident defendant.”).
186. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (“A court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”). For a broader discussion on the
long-arm statutes of the fifty states, see VEDDER PRICE, LONG-ARM STATUTES:
A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY (2003), http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08
-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf.
187. See Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855).
188. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 86 (2010) (“At the same time
as federal dockets increased in size, many judges began to believe those dockets contained too many diversity cases.”).
189. Id.
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are different than those of diversity jurisdiction. States can
exercise personal jurisdiction because of their sovereign author191
ity. The restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction
192
are a “matter of individual liberty.” In other words, diversity
jurisdiction asks which court, state or federal, is the proper adjudicator within a forum state. Personal jurisdiction asks if the
forum state even has the power to adjudicate the issue.
To superimpose the restrictions of a statutory limitation,
crafted by Congress for an entirely different purpose, upon a
constitutionally defined doctrine constitutes judicial overreach.
States could have chosen to create additional restrictions on the
exercise of general jurisdiction. For example, Ohio state courts
do not interpret the long-arm statute to extend to the limits of
193
due process. Instead, states have chosen to make their longarm statutes coextensive with the Constitution. Restrictions on
general jurisdiction that extend beyond the constitutional limit
should be determined by the state legislatures, not the courts.
The cost of such an arbitrary restriction is the infringement of
194
the sovereign power of the states.
B. THE CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Demonstrating that general jurisdiction could be more ex195
pansive is different from proving that it should be expanded.
This Section provides that justification. It argues that the variety of ways in which corporations organize their corporate functions presents a unique challenge to the current general jurisdiction doctrine.
1. The Federalism Problem: Unnecessary Restraints on State
Sovereignty
On its face, the M-form corporation does not present any
unique problem for the general jurisdiction doctrine. Even
190. See supra Part I.B.
191. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011).
192. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982) (“The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not
from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.”).
193. See Hoover Co. v. Robeson Indus. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 671, 673 (N.D.
Ohio 1995); see also OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2307.382 (West 2015).
194. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
195. See Stein, supra note 43, at 548 (“Why should general jurisdiction be
more expansive?”).
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though the corporation delegates part of the corporate function
to a divisional office, that office might still reside in the same
state as the corporate headquarters. In that instance, the Mform corporation is no more difficult of a case than the U-form
corporation.
The decentralization of the M-form, however, allows a corporation to disperse its corporate functions nationally. Take, for
example, the prototypical M-form corporation: General Motors
196
(GM). GM maintains its corporate headquarters in Detroit,
197
Michigan. Recently, GM gave Cadillac, a divisional branch of
the corporation, the authority to establish a headquarters in
198
New York. The Cadillac headquarters operates as a “separate
business unit” that can “pursue growing opportunities in the
199
luxury automotive market.” Johan de Nysschen, who serves
as the President of Cadillac and the General Motors Executive
200
Vice President, manages the Cadillac office. This GM set-up
demonstrates the limitations of the current general jurisdiction
doctrine.
Given that GM maintains its headquarters in Michigan,
courts would likely view Michigan as GM’s principal place of
business. By conflating the principal place of business with the
Hertz test, courts restrict the general jurisdiction fora by assuming that only a single location qualifies as the principal
201
place of business. This approach implicates the balance of
202
If general jurisdiction is proper in
horizontal federalism.
Michigan because GM determines and directs its long-term
196. See Haiwen Zhou, Market Structure and Organizational Form, 71 S.
ECON. J. 705, 705 (2005) (“An example of an M-form firm is the General Motors Company.”); see also CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 158–60 (describing the
organizational structure of General Motors).
197. Company Profile for General Motors Co (GM), BLOOMBERG, http://
www.bloomberg.com/quote/GM:US (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
198. Dale Buss, Cadillac Moves HQ to New York as New Chief De Nysschen
Holds Sway, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dalebuss/
2014/09/23/cadillac-moves-hq-to-new-york-as-new-chief-de-nysschen-holds
-sway.
199. Id.
200. Leadership: Corporate Officers, GEN. MOTORS, http://www.gm
.com/company/leadership/corporate-officers.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
201. See, e.g., Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221,
225–26 (2d Cir. 2014) (identifying the principal place of business as a single
location); Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (limiting the fora of general jurisdiction to the place of incorporation and principal
place of business).
202. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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203

strategy, why is New York precluded from exercising general
jurisdiction? After all, the New York office serves a corporate
function; it manages the day-to-day operations and direction of
204
the Cadillac product.
Absent a constitutional constraint, the current doctrine
“unduly curtails” New York’s sovereign authority to adjudicate
205
disputes against corporate defendants. The requirement that
the principal place of business exist in a single state is a crea206
ture of statutory limitation. As discussed above, this limitation derives from both the text of the diversity statute and its
207
legislative history. In contrast, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the constitutional restriction on per208
sonal jurisdiction. This Note argues that there is no Due Process consideration involved with expanding the general juris209
diction doctrine to include GM’s office in New York.
Therefore, the narrow scope of general jurisdiction fora infringes on the fifty States’ “status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
210
system.”
2. Asymmetric Consequences: Separating the Headquarters
from the Control of Daily Operations
A common reorganization strategy of corporations is to
separate the control of daily operations from the headquarters,
placing the former function in another office, usually in another
state. The separation of the corporate headquarters from other
corporate functions, such as control of daily operations, creates
a jurisdictional gap. Mountain State Carbon illustrates this
point. In Central West Virginia Energy Co. v. Mountain State
Carbon, LLC, Severstal Wheeling maintained a corporate office
in Michigan where its officers “are responsible for significant
oversight and strategic decision-making at Severstal Wheel-

203. Cf. Chandler, supra note 139.
204. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
205. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also supra Part I.A.3.
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
207. See supra Part II.A.2.
208. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (“Since the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the validity of [personal jurisdiction] may be
directly questioned, and . . . resisted, on the grounds that proceedings . . . do
not constitute due process of law.”).
209. See infra Part III.
210. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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211

ing.” At the same time, the office did not manage the day-to212
That management occurred in Wheeling,
day operations.
213
West Virginia. These activities included purchasing materials, selling products, managing environmental compliance, and
214
administering human resources matters such as payroll. In
essence, Wheeling is where the corporation conducted its “daily
215
management activities.”
Following the Hertz rule, the Fourth Circuit determined
that the corporation’s principal place of business was in Michigan, where “nearly all of the high-level officers work, make sig216
nificant corporate decisions, and set corporate policy.” This
demonstrates that the Hertz rule is an inflexible test for the
manner that corporations organize their operations. The Hertz
217
Court recognized this problem, but faced statutory limitations
218
of the diversity statute. Under the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine, only Michigan can exercise general jurisdiction
over Severstal Wheeling because that is the state where
219
Severstal Wheeling maintains its headquarters.
Consider that a citizen of Michigan that does temporary
steel work in West Virginia for Severstal Wheeling may sue in
Michigan. For any court, this scenario is clear cut because
Severstal Wheeling’s headquarters resides in Michigan. However, imagine a citizen of West Virginia, who is a steel worker
for Severstal Wheeling, transports steel sheets to a client in
Maryland. In Maryland, the truck malfunctions, causing a
crash. The accident report details negligent maintenance of the
truck as the primary cause of the accident. If a court concludes
that the accident is unrelated to Severstal Wheeling’s activities
211. 636 F.3d 101, 104–05 (4th Cir. 2011). Although the issue in Mountain
State Carbon was ultimately one of diversity jurisdiction, the fact pattern
demonstrates how different corporate structures may complicate the general
jurisdiction analysis.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 105.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 106–07 (“[E]mployees in Wheeling, West Virginia ‘are engaged in nearly all facets of the company’s operations’ and . . . ‘managing [of]
the company’s operations occur[s] in Wheeling.’” (last alteration in original)).
216. Id.
217. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95–96 (2010).
218. Id. at 93 (arguing that the words “place” and “principal” denote a singular location); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
219. Again, the issues involved in Mountain State Carbon, namely a coal
supply agreement with a West Virginian company, would likely give West Virginia specific personal jurisdiction over Severstal Wheeling.
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in West Virginia, could the injured steel worker bring a suit
against Severstal Wheeling in West Virginia? The answer is
likely no. Although Severstal Wheeling directs its steel making
operation out of its West Virginia office, that office is not the
company’s headquarters. Thus, the steel worker could only
bring a suit in Michigan, where the headquarters is located.
Is it fair that only Michigan serves as a general jurisdiction
forum for Severstal Wheeling? The West Virginia office has the
authority to purchase materials, sell products, manage environmental compliance, and administer human resource mat220
ters. In the injured steel worker’s case, the corporate authority that pulled the proverbial trigger on the negligent
maintenance of the truck resides in West Virginia. In fact, the
West Virginia office directs the impact of Severstal Wheeling’s
daily operations, no matter where they occur in the United
States. The availability of general jurisdiction in Michigan and
its absence in West Virginia demonstrates the asymmetric nature of the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine. Severstal
Wheeling exercises corporate functions in both states. However,
only Michigan may exert general jurisdiction in response to
Severstal Wheeling’s activity. Thus, it offends traditional notions of justice that, despite the extensive reach from West Virginia, Severstal Wheeling is immune from suits on general
matters in West Virginia.
3. The Problem Replicated in Branch Offices and Franchise
Arrangements
As illustrated above, decentralized corporate structures
present two challenges to the corporate general jurisdiction
doctrine: (1) they restrict the states’ exercise of their sovereignty through general jurisdiction; and (2) they produce asymmetric consequences for the exercise of corporate functions. Both of
these challenges arise in two other common corporate arrangements: branch offices and franchise arrangements.
M-form corporations also delegate the command and con221
trol functions of the general office by creating regional offices.
A common form of this delegation is the branch office. The
branch office manages part of the corporation’s day-to-day op222
erations. This characteristic raises the question of what kind
of management power confers general jurisdiction. The delega220. See Mountain State Carbon, 636 F.3d at 105.
221. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
222. See Chandler, supra note 139.
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tion of authority to branch offices is a purposeful decision by
the corporation. On one hand, the headquarters makes strategy
223
decisions, such as product positioning and advertising. On the
other hand, the branches make the decisions about implemen224
tation and execution of those strategy decisions. By diffusing
the power to manage day-to-day operations to branches, a corporation prevents its headquarters from becoming overloaded
with information and duties—the result is profitability and
225
greater efficiency.
Even though the branches in M-form corporations exercise
traditional corporate functions, these offices escape the grasp of
general jurisdiction. Prior to Daimler, courts often found that
states had general jurisdiction over corporations through their
226
branch offices. The scope of general jurisdiction changed after
that decision. Consider, for example, Gucci America, Inc. v.
Weixing Li, in which the Second Circuit held that the Bank of
China (BOC) was not subject to general jurisdiction in New
227
York as a result of its New York branch. Clearly, the BOC is
neither incorporated nor holds its principal place of business in
228
New York. A critical characteristic of the New York branch of
the BOC is that it does not have “possession or control over information located ‘in any other branch or office of the Bank of
229
China.’” The Second Circuit believed that Daimler “cast[s]
doubt” on New York’s tradition of finding general jurisdiction
230
over local branches “doing business” in the forum. This gap
further exemplifies the asymmetry of general jurisdiction—by
ignoring how corporations delegate and restructure traditional
corporate functions, the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine
allows for the exercise of these functions without the risk of exposure to all-purpose jurisdiction.
223. See David A. Garvin & Lynne C. Levesque, The Multiunit Enterprise,
HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2008), https://hbr.org/2008/06/the-multiunit-enterprise.
224. Id.
225. See Chandler, supra note 139.
226. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916–17 (N.Y.
1917); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“Prior to Daimler, controlling precedent in this Circuit made it clear that a
foreign bank with a branch in New York was properly subject to general personal jurisdiction here.”). For further examples of pre-Daimler cases, see Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95 (2d Cir. 2000); Hoffritz for
Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1985).
227. 768 F.3d at 129.
228. Id. at 126.
229. Id. at 127.
230. Id. at 135.

Chung_4FMT

1630

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1599

A corporation arranged as a franchise presents a similar
jurisdictional problem. Consider the facts of Burger King Corp.
231
Burger King oversees its franchise system
v. Rudzewicz.
232
through a two-tiered structure. The contracts headquarters,
based in Miami “sets policy and works directly with its fran233
chisees in attempting to resolve major problems,” while the
day-to-day management of the franchisees is managed by a
network of ten district offices, which report to the Miami of234
fice. Burger King is a Florida corporation whose principal of235
fices are in Miami. The Florida courts clearly have general
jurisdiction over any claim as Florida is both the state of incorporation and home to the principal place of business.
The asymmetry occurs, however, when considering the role
of the franchises. Assume that Burger King enters a franchise
agreement with a Missouri business. Burger King’s Chicago
district office is responsible for managing all franchises in the
Midwest, including Missouri. The Chicago office directs the
business of the Missouri franchise, including product line-up,
employment contracts, and financing. Imagine that a Chicago
Cubs fan travels to St. Louis to observe the heated rivalry between the Cardinals and the Cubs. After eating at the Missouri
franchise, the fan is infected with salmonella. The Chicago office directed the purchase of beef that is responsible for the
salmonella infection. Again, the asymmetric nature of the general jurisdiction doctrine prevents the Cubs fan from suing
Burger King in Chicago.
4. The Principal Place of Business Test Gets It Right for
Centralized Corporations
Despite these shortcomings, the search for the principal
place of business, or its functional equivalent, makes sense
when the corporation adopts a centralized structure. The Hertz
test relies on a single center for direction, control, and coordi236
nation of the corporation’s activities. Consequently, the centralized nature of the U-form structure is an ideal characteristic for this test because all the corporate functions are located
in the general offices. The corporate headquarters is easily as231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Id. at 465.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 464.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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certainable because many corporations openly provide their locations and list the corporate officers that work there on the
237
company website. Additionally, the single location avoids the
possibility that a court must choose between two different
states. Although there is a chance that a U-form corporation
might maintain some of its high-level officers in another
238
state, its structure generally requires a central location of
corporate control. Unfortunately, U-form corporations are not
the only corporate structure, and, in fact, are less prevalent
than the multidivisional structure.
III. ADOPTING A BROADER DEFINITION OF CORPORATE
ACTIVITIES
Showing that the current general jurisdiction doctrine does
not account for the variety of corporate structures is, of course,
not the endpoint of this Note. Courts should abandon the narrow limitations of the Hertz test, and should instead adapt the
general jurisdiction doctrine to corporate structure. Section A
introduces the notion of “corporate functions” and provides a
definition of the concept. Section B explains the advantages of
this definition. Section C concludes by describing how this definition is consistent with jurisdictional theory.
A. GENERAL JURISDICTION SHOULD FOLLOW CORPORATE
STRUCTURE
The current general jurisdiction doctrine does not account
for corporations that decentralize their organizational structure. In light of this deficiency, how can courts adjust the general corporate jurisdiction rule? The answer is simple: general
jurisdiction must follow corporate structure. Courts can reach
this ideal by finding a corporation subject to general jurisdiction in any state in which the corporation exercises a corporate
function. Corporate functions are those that normally occur in
239
the traditional headquarters. There are two corporate func237. See, e.g., Global Locations, A BULLSEYE VIEW, https://corporate
.target.com/careers/global-locations (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); Mailing Addresses, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/help/addresses (last visited
Mar. 8, 2016).
238. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010).
239. Cf. Chandler, supra note 139 (“[T]he executives at the new headquarters carried out two closely related functions. . . . [First,] determine strategies
to maintain and then utilize for the long-term the firm’s organizational skills,
facilities and capital and to allocate resources . . . . The second was more administrative or loss-preventive.”).
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tions: (1) the direction of all activities in furtherance of the corporate objective; and (2) the command and control of day-to-day
240
operations. So, when a corporation decentralizes its operations by moving a corporate function (i.e., the command and
control of day-to-day operations) to an office in another state,
general jurisdiction would follow that corporation to that state.
To put it differently, the corporate functions test focuses on
the corporation’s structure rather than the corporation’s activities. To illustrate this difference, recall the Mountain State
Carbon case, in which Severstal Wheeling had two offices—a
corporate headquarters in Michigan and an office in West Virginia to manage the day-to-day operations. Applying the Hertz
test, a court would look for Severstal Wheeling’s “center of di241
rection, control, and coordination.” However, this analysis assumes that all of these functions occur in the same place and,
therefore, Severstal Wheeling presented a difficult case. On one
hand, the direction of Severstal Wheeling’s activities happens
in Michigan. On the other hand, the control and coordination of
those activities takes place in West Virginia.
Direction and coordination refers to where a corporation
plans, appraises, and determines the corporation’s overall goals
242
and policies. These decisions occur on the macro level and are
likely directed by high-level corporate officers including the
chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief finan243
cial officer. For example, a corporate headquarters where a
CEO makes investment decisions and product line development
plans is a place from which the corporation directs its activities.
In contrast, a branch office that implements the decisions of the
corporate headquarters does not direct the corporation’s activities.
Control refers to where the corporation manages the dayto-day operations. Although Severstal Wheeling’s steel operations happen in West Virginia, the defining feature of the corporate function inquiry is Severstal Wheeling’s control over
those operations. It is important to note that the corporate
function is the control over the day-to-day operations and not
the operations themselves. To illustrate this difference, Moun240. Id.
241. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93.
242. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9 (providing an overview of the tasks
undertaken at different levels of administration).
243. See Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d
101, 105 (4th Cir. 2011).
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tain State Carbon is again useful. The West Virginia office
managed the steel operation by purchasing materials, contracting to sell products, managing administrative compliance, and
244
administering human resource matters. The steel operation
itself is the production of steel sheets. Because Severstal
Wheeling manages the steel operation from the West Virginia
office, general jurisdiction would be proper under the corporate
functions test. However, if Severstal Wheeling consolidated the
management of the steel operation to its office in Michigan,
general jurisdiction would not be proper in West Virginia, even
though Severstal Wheeling continued to make steel sheets in
West Virginia. Thus, the command and control of daily operations does not include the actual day-to-day operations themselves.
The corporate function test unchains the general jurisdiction inquiry from the bounds of the Hertz principal place of
business test. By doing so, the test eliminates an artificial constraint on state sovereignty, which the courts have superimposed on the states from Congress’ diversity jurisdiction statute. Furthermore, the corporate functions test provides states
with the flexibility to exercise jurisdiction over corporations
when they exert corporate functions from within their borders.
245
Recall the Mountain State Carbon case. Because Severstal
Wheeling delegated control over its day-to-day operations to the
West Virginia office, West Virginia would be able to hold
Severstal Wheeling accountable for its corporate actions.
The corporate functions test fills the gaping hole left by the
mismatch between judicial doctrine and corporate structure.
The exercise of corporate functions would no longer result in
asymmetric consequences. If the branch of a corporation manages the day-to-day operations of the corporation’s activities,
then the corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in that
state. This analysis holds true for the franchise arrangements
246
as well. Recall the facts of Burger King. Although the Miami
office directs the strategic decision-making, the headquarters
delegated the command and control of day-to-day operations to
247
the district offices. The regional offices serve as a divisional
office in an M-form corporation. Under the corporate-business
activities distinction, Burger King would be amenable to suit on
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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an unrelated cause of action in Chicago, the location of the
franchise office, because it conducts corporate activity in the
state.
B. ADVANTAGES OF THE CORPORATE FUNCTIONS DEFINITION
The corporate functions definition provides the best explanation for general jurisdiction, and offers several advantages.
First, it is a narrow approach that emphasizes characteristics
of corporations that tend to be limited by nature. The proliferation of high-level corporate activity is inefficient and runs coun248
ter to the current corporate trend. A narrow approach is
249
clearly favored after Daimler. Although the Daimler inquiry
is simpler, the corporate functions test does not substantially
expand the reach of general jurisdiction. In order for a corporation to be subject to general jurisdiction under this Note’s approach, a corporation must delegate corporate functions to an
office. These functions are limited and finite.
Second, it creates a predictable and stable reasoning for
courts to follow. The lower courts have had difficulty applying
the Court’s prior general jurisdiction rules in a consistent man250
ner. The most difficult cases arise when decentralized corpo251
rate structures are present. The Supreme Court has already
248. See HANS D. BAUMANN, BUILDING LEAN COMPANIES: HOW TO KEEP
COMPANIES PROFITABLE AS THEY GROW 17 (2009) (“[Too many layers of management] can place a burden on support services analogous to the burden
placed on the heart of an obese animal . . . .”). Contra Michael Goold & S. David Young, When Lean Isn’t Mean, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2005), https://
hbr.org/2005/04/when-lean-isnt-mean (suggesting empirical evidence might
not support the thesis that “a lean and mean headquarters is associated with
superior financial performance”).
249. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“[O]nly a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to allpurpose jurisdiction . . . .”); Colin T. Kemp et al., Daimler AG v. Bauman:
Court Again Rejects a “Sprawling View of General Jurisdiction,” PILLSBURY
(Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/daimler-ag-v
-bauman-court-again-rejects-a-sprawling-jurisdiction (“[T]he circumstances [in
which one can sue a corporation under general jurisdiction in a forum other
than the state of incorporation or home of the principal place of business] are
vanishingly narrow.”).
250. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34
SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 829–34 (2004) (describing the various inconsistent
applications of general jurisdiction).
251. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir.
2014) (exemplifying the branch office problem); Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v.
Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 107 n.3 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We recognize that the proliferation of complex corporate structures among business
enterprises may compel further attention to the issue of ‘principal place of
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acknowledged the “easily ascertainable” nature of high-level
252
corporate activities. By providing a doctrine which can be
consistently applied, the corporate functions definition will help
253
corporations structure their conduct and make better busi254
ness and investment decisions.
Third, it avoids the problem of corporate “presence.” Courts
255
have struggled to abandon the fiction of corporate “presence.”
256
This is in part due to a historical reliance on this concept and
the Supreme Court’s failure to reject traditional indicia of cor257
porate “presence” in its general jurisdiction cases. The corporate functions definition distinction involves factors that are
258
distinct enough from the prior “presence” test. Prior theories
of general jurisdiction focus on the corporation’s activities ra259
ther than how the corporation is structured. The corporate
functions test removes corporate activities, such as sales, manufacturing, and production, from the analysis. Instead, the inquiry solely focuses on the corporation’s structure and how it
delegates corporate functions. Therefore, it is unlikely that
business’. . . .”).
252. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (“Those affiliations have the virtue of
being . . . easily ascertainable.”); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010)
(“A ‘nerve center’ approach . . . is simple to apply comparatively speaking.”).
253. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980) (“The Due Process Clause . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”).
254. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94.
255. See, e.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.
2014).
256. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y.
1917) (“All that is requisite [for jurisdiction] is that enough be done to enable
us to say that the corporation is here.”).
257. The Supreme Court continues to list the factors of corporate “presence” in its general jurisdiction decisions. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court does not dispute . . . the presence of
[Daimler’s] multiple offices, the direct distribution of thousands of products
accounting for billions of dollars in sales, and continuous interaction with customers . . . .”); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
411 (1984) (“Helicol never has owned real or personal property in Texas and
never has maintained an office or establishment there.”); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952) (“There [Benguet’s president]
maintained an office in which he . . . did many things on behalf of the company.”).
258. Compare supra Part I.A (describing the factors of corporate presence),
with supra Part III.A (describing the factors of corporate functions).
259. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
411–12.
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courts will revert to a reliance on corporate “presence” in a “rit260
ualistic application” of the proposed solution.
One risk of the corporate functions definition is that it
might cause corporations to shift from a multidivisional structure to a multisubsidiary one. Some corporations have already
made a transition away from MDF to MSF because of incen261
tives created by corporate tax reform. The possibility that the
former might incur more litigation liability than the latter
might also incentivize corporations to switch.
This reaction, however, should not be considered a disadvantage of the distinction. A central tenet of general jurisdiction is that corporations should be afforded the opportunity “to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
262
suit.” If, following the adoption of the corporate functions definition, corporations choose to reorganize, it will be an indication that the doctrine of general jurisdiction is operating as it
should.
C. THE CORPORATE FUNCTIONS DEFINITION IS BASED ON A
STRONG THEORETICAL RATIONALE
Showing that the corporate functions definition offers several advantages is, of course, only a necessary but not sufficient
condition for its adoption. A desirable proposal must also rest
on a strong theoretical rationale. Although the corporate functions definition might be an arbitrary line, as all lines tend to
be, it is consistent with general jurisdiction theories. Given the
263
lack of theoretical foundation of general jurisdiction, in particular as applied to doing business jurisdiction, a strong consistency with jurisdiction theory sets this line apart from other
approaches. This Section explores how the corporate-business
activities distinction fits with various theories.
1. The Corporate Functions Test Provides Reciprocal
Consequences for Benefits
The corporate functions definition fits well with a theory of

260. Edmond R. Anderson, Jr., Personal Jurisdiction over Outsiders, 28
MO. L. REV. 336, 383–84 (1963).
261. See Zey & Swenson, supra note 160, at 242.
262. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980);
see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
263. See supra Part I.A.
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264

reciprocity. Corporate functions govern and control business
265
activities. Decisions made at the corporate level “encompass[]
every phase of [a corporation’s]’ activities—production, sales,
distribution, advertising, public relations and all other related
266
facets.” In other words, no aspect of the corporation’s activities escapes the management of high-level officers.
As a result, all of the corporate functions will have a connection to the policies and decisions made in states where there
is corporate activity. Consider a mining corporation with its
headquarters in Ohio but mining activities in another state or
country. Even though the mining operations do not take place
in Ohio, the headquarters directed those activities from that
state. For instance, the corporate activity in Ohio sets production limits, determines payment rates of the miners, and ensures compliance with various mining regulations. In this
sense, the corporate functions are connected with every state in
which the corporation conducts mining activities.
To put this characteristic in contrast with the mining operations, imagine that a court provides general jurisdiction over
the Ohio corporation because of its mining operations in Virginia. Unlike the corporate activities in Ohio, the mining operations only have a relationship to the state of Virginia. It is
proper for Virginia to regulate the effects of those activities,
267
and it can do so under specific jurisdiction. It fails any commonplace sense of reciprocity that the local activity of mining
operations gives Virginia authority over activities having no
268
connection to those mining operations. The burden of allpurpose jurisdiction in return for the corporation’s privileges
and protection to mine in Virginia is likely to be “far more se269
vere” and, therefore, be far from reciprocal.

264. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 728–29.
265. See Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
266. Id.
267. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 26, at 1144–63 (describing the applications of specific jurisdiction).
268. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014) (“Nothing
in International Shoe and its progeny suggests that ‘a particular quantum of
local activity’ should give a State authority over a ‘far larger quantum of . . .
activity’ having no connection to any in-state activity.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Feder, supra note 14, at 694)).
269. See Feder, supra note 14, at 694.
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2. The Corporate Functions Test Aligns with State
Sovereignty
Limiting general jurisdiction to a corporation’s principal
270
place of business is far too narrow of a view. State sovereign
authority to adjudicate disputes should only be limited by the
271
Due Process Clause and the federalist structure. The princi272
pal place of business is a creature of statute. Imposing such a
limitation, crafted by Congress for an entirely different purpose, upon a doctrine limited only by the Constitution constitutes judicial overreach. The cost of such an arbitrary restriction is the infringement of the sovereign power of the
273
states.
The corporate functions definition offers a slightly broader
view of proper jurisdiction. Although the divisional offices of an
M-form corporation might not make a corporation a citizen of
the forum state, the relationship between the office and the forum state is no less potent. As discussed above, each of the corporate functions demonstrate a similar level of reciprocity and
predictability.
3. The Corporate Functions Test Promotes Forum Certainty
The necessity of providing a plaintiff a certain forum in
which it can sue a corporation offers a weak theoretical justifi274
cation. If this is the underlying basis for jurisdiction, then
Daimler, and by extension Goodyear, has already exceeded this
275
purpose by providing not one but two potential fora. The current scope of general jurisdiction, as a result, might actually be
an over-inclusive means to serve a plaintiff’s convenience. In
order to serve the purpose of providing a certain forum, only
the state of incorporation is necessary because every corpora270. See Blanchard, supra note 14, at 900 (“A corporation is ‘at home’ only
in its state of incorporation and in the one state where its principal place of
business, or nerve center, is located.”).
271. See Part I.A.
272. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
273. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Yet [the
majority] never explains why the State should lose [the power to adjudicate]
when . . . a corporation ‘divide[s] [its] command and coordinating functions
among officers who work at several different locations.’”).
274. See id. at 760 (majority opinion) (“These bases afford plaintiffs
recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant
may be sued on any and all claims.”).
275. See id. (identifying the place of incorporation and the principal place
of business as paradigm fora); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011) (making the same identification).
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tion must be incorporated. As a result, every plaintiff would
have some forum in which to pursue a corporate defendant.
Therefore, forum certainty might be part of the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction cases, but not a
dispositive one. The other justifications offer a countervailing
explanation that justifies the corporate functions definition.
To be sure, Daimler promotes greater forum certainty—a
court only needs to look for the corporation’s headquarters or
the state of incorporation. In contrast, the corporate functions
test requires courts to discern the internal organization of a
corporation. Many of these functions might not be readily apparent to a court without intricate knowledge of the corporation’s structure. Jurisdictional discovery mitigates the impact
276
of any uncertainty. If a defendant asserts a defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction, a court may permit discovery of jurisdic277
Thus, discovery and admissions of corporate
tional facts.
structure would simplify the jurisdictional inquiry.
4. The Corporate Functions Test Is More Predictable
The corporate function approach would also make the general jurisdiction doctrine more predictable and consistent. To be
sure, the place of incorporation and principal place of business
are excellent paradigm fora. Both tend to be clear and readily
278
apparent. When a corporation is sued in neither of the paradigm fora, the courts struggle to consistently rationalize their
279
decisions. Far more often, however, courts constrain their
276. See generally S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States
Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2010) (describing the
role of discovery in determining the existence of personal jurisdiction). Justice
Ginsburg believes that the Daimler standard negates the need for jurisdictional discovery. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
277. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978)
(“[W]here issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the facts bearing on such issues.”); Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989). A court, however, is not required to
grant jurisdictional discovery. See Strong, supra note 276, at 524–32 (explaining the highly discretionary process by which courts determine whether to order jurisdictional discovery).
278. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir.
2014) (expressing that the existence of a local office is “clearly not ‘an exceptional case’” (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19)); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting both the plaintiff’s tag
jurisdiction argument and exceptional case argument for personal jurisdiction); Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-542-JL, 2015 WL
3506517, at *6 (D.N.H. June 3, 2015) (equating the exceptional case require-
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analysis to comparing the facts of the case before them with
280
those of prior Supreme Court cases. The problem is that the
courts do not have a set of factors that help them identify “ex281
ceptional cases.” Put differently, courts do not ask why a case
is not “exceptional.” How then can a court properly identify
when a case is exceptional?
It is possible that the courts are getting the right results,
but doctrine without a clear rationale might be why Daimler’s
282
clarification was necessary at all. The corporate function approach make courts’ exercise of general jurisdiction more predictable. First, a test that reflects how corporations are actually
283
structured should promote accuracy. Courts do not substitute
their own expertise for that of a corporation’s business ra284
tionale. Similarly, courts should not ignore how corporations
choose to organize their business. Second, much like the Hertz
test, the corporate function approach does not require courts to
285
assess a corporation’s business activities. When courts look to
those business activities, the doctrine “invites greater litigation
286
and can lead to strange results.” The most recent cases on
general jurisdiction indicate that the courts may be headed
287
down this path. The corporate function approach eliminates
that unpredictability.
5. The Theoretical Support Is Similarly Strong for the
Management of Day-to-Day Operations
It is possible that the totality of corporate functions aligns
properly with the general jurisdiction theories, but each funcment with a search for a “surrogate for [a corporation’s] principal place of
business”); Stroud v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 381, 388–89 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (rejecting the existence of manufacturing plants as an exceptional case);
Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F. Supp. 3d 97, 104–05
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting website activity as an exceptional case).
280. See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 745 F.3d
30, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2014); Chatwal Hotels & Resorts, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 104.
281. See supra note 279.
282. See generally Twitchell, supra note 14, at 629–30 (arguing that general jurisdiction’s difficult application results in confusion and unpredictability).
283. See Rautenstrauch v. Stern/Leach Co., No. Civ.A 03-10723-DPW, 2004
WL 42573, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2004) (“[C]ourts must be careful to consider
the fit of model to reality . . . .”).
284. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974) (explaining the “business judgment rule”).
285. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93–94 (2010).
286. Id. at 94.
287. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text.
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tion independently might not. Recall that there are two corporate functions: the direction of long-term strategy of the corporation and the management of the corporation’s day-to-day operations. The former function is the least susceptible to this
criticism for two reasons. First, the corporate headquarters, in
288
any organization structure, directs its long-term strategy.
Courts have consistently viewed the corporate headquarters as
the principal place of business, and, therefore, a proper forum
289
for general jurisdiction. Second, there is nothing inherently
unfair about asserting jurisdiction in a state where a corporation keeps it corporate headquarters. A corporation expects to
be sued in that state and structures its business accordingly
with a legal support team and intricate knowledge of the state’s
290
laws.
Courts might not believe that corporation’s management of
day-to-day operations hold equal weight to the functions of a
corporate headquarters, especially if these functions occur in an
office in a different state. The management of day-to-day operations, however, is an important function that should confer
general jurisdiction. This function is integral to the success of
291
the corporation. In fact, corporations choose to delegate the
function to divisional offices because of the related economic
292
benefits and managing advantages. The divisional headquar293
ters also have a national, rather than local, reach. The corporation derives unique benefits from the divisional office, both
through economic gains and organizational efficiency, and, as
such, it avails itself of the benefits of the state in which it’s located. Therefore, the management function of a corporation is
equally weighty in the jurisdictional context and should justify
the exercise of general jurisdiction.

288. See supra Part II.B.
289. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“The majority does not dispute that a State can exercise general
jurisdiction where a corporate defendant has its corporate headquarters . . . .”).
290. Interview with Eric Tostrud, Of Counsel, Lockridge Grindal Nauen
P.L.L.P., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 6, 2015).
291. See Part II.B.2 (describing the economic benefits of the multidivisional
form).
292. See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.
293. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 12 (“The executives in the departmental headquarters plan, administer, and coordinate the activities of one
function on a . . . national scale rather than just locally.”).
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6. The Corporate Functions Definition Is Consistent with
Precedent
Of course, courts should not adopt a different approach
simply because the approach rests on sound theoretical
grounds. Any change to the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine should be consistent with precedent. Nothing in Daimler
suggests that the Supreme Court limited general jurisdiction
over corporations to the forum where it is incorporated or has
294
its principal place of business. In fact, the Court left the door
295
open. To be sure, the place of incorporation and principal
place of business are excellent paradigm fora.
The Court, however, did not limit the proper general juris296
diction to these two fora. In “an exceptional case,” a corporation’s operations may be “so substantial and of such a nature as
297
to render the corporation at home in that State.” Courts have
interpreted this standard to require the functional equivalent
298
of incorporation or principal place of business. Other courts
have treated Daimler’s “exceptional case” as a search for a
299
“surrogate for [a corporation’s] principal place of business.”
As the history of corporate structure shows, determining
the “functional equivalent” of the corporation’s principal place
of business will vary based on the organizational structure. The
corporate functions approach is consistent with the search for a
“functional equivalent.” It provides a nuanced approach by recognizing that corporations can, and often do, separate their
300
functions. To put it differently, by looking for the offices from
which a corporation directs its corporate strategy and manages
its day-to-day operations test, a court is looking for the “functions” of a traditional corporate headquarters. In this way, the
294. See Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-542-JL, 2015
WL 3506517, at *5 (D.N.H. June 3, 2015).
295. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014) (“We do not
foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case . . . a forum other than its
formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may . . . render the
corporation at home in that State.”).
296. Id. at 760 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business . . . .” (emphasis in original)).
297. Id. at 761 n.19.
298. See, e.g., Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir.
2014); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL Docket No. 875, 2014
WL 5394310, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014). For an example of an “exceptional
case,” see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
299. Presby Patent Tr., 2015 WL 3506517, at *6.
300. See supra Part I.B.2 and accompanying text.
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corporate functions test is consistent with the court’s precedent
on “exceptional cases.”
CONCLUSION
Today, corporations come in all shapes and sizes. As this
Note demonstrates, corporations divide their “center of direc301
tion, control, and coordination” in a far more nuanced and
variable manner than simply maintaining a centralized corporate headquarters. However, courts have given little thought to
this prospect and, instead, have committed to a test that relies
on the archaic assumption that every corporation structures it302
self in a centralized manner. Instead, in Daimler, the Supreme Court superimposed the restrictions of the diversity
statute onto the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine by
harkening to the Hertz test. In doing so, the Supreme Court
unnecessarily infringed on state sovereignty—general jurisdiction is unrestrained by congressional legislation, and bound only by the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, the Daimler test
separates corporate general jurisdiction theory from the realities of corporate structure—creating a mismatch between theory and practice.
Therefore, courts should expand the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine, ever so slightly, by recognizing that a corporation’s exercise of corporate functions (i.e., direction of corporate activities and management of day-to-day operations)
subjects a corporation to general jurisdiction. By doing so, the
courts can remove the artificial limitation on the exercise of
state sovereignty and create a predictable and fair test for general jurisdiction. Changing the general jurisdiction test to
adapt to how corporations organize their structures will not
open the floodgates. Instead, courts will be able to handle tough
jurisdictional cases with greater flexibility. When a corporation
divides its strategic decision-making from its management of
day-to-day operations, the general jurisdiction test should account for this structure. Thus, the corporate functions test is a
step in the right direction.

301. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010).
302. See id.

